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ABSTRACT 
In light of the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s August 2014 
Accounting Standard Update on management Going Concern Statements, 
research using financial ratios to predict bankruptcy is more relevant than 
ever. Even though numerous research articles examine factors that predict 
bankruptcy, few make the distinction between the factors that affect 
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This work examines the factors 
that affect these two bankruptcy types (7 and 11) using the Securities and 
Exchange Commission data on 425 firms that filed for Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We tested our data using t-test, ordinary least 
squares (OLS), and logistic regression. Our results indicate that the asset 
turnover ratio and going concern statement are significant predictors of 
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We note the implications for 
auditors, corporate management, corporate creditors and investors, and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
KEY WORDS  Chapter 7 Bankruptcy; Chapter 11 Bankruptcy; Financial Ratios; 
Going Concern Statement 
Identifying factors reflective of corporate success or failure has been the subject of much 
research and discussion for decades. The topic has taken on a renewed emphasis with the 
U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board’s August 2014 pronouncement (FASB 2014) 
requiring corporate management to address corporate continuity starting with reporting 
periods ending after December 15, 2016. Numerous studies have compared bankrupt and 
viable firms, developed predictive models of bankruptcy, and examined financial ratios that 
* Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Douglas K. Barney, 4201 Grant
Line Rd., Hillside Hall 217M, New Albany, IN  47150.
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are predictive of bankruptcy. In previous bankruptcy studies, researchers have examined 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies as the same. They are not the same, however.  
U.S. Federal bankruptcy law (U.S. Code Title 11) identifies six types of 
bankruptcy. The two bankruptcy filing types most commonly associated with businesses 
are Chapter 7 and Chapter 11. With a Chapter 7 filing, corporate management plans to 
“close up shop.” Corporate assets are liquidated and distributions are made to creditors in 
a liquidation plan; the business ends operations. With a Chapter 11 filing, corporate 
management anticipates that the corporation has the ability to continue operating after a 
financial reorganization of the corporation. The corporation will undergo a financial 
reorganization but will continue operations during this reorganization period. 
This article examines these two bankruptcy types (7 and 11) as two of three 
(including viable corporations) possible outcomes. It identifies factors predictive of 
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 bankruptcy using t-tests, correlations, OLS regression, and 
logistic regression. The study also examines the predictive ability (ability to predict 
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 bankruptcy) of the resulting OLS and logit models. In 
addition, this study splits the bankrupt-firm set into more refined data sets: firms filing 
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and firms filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Because the 
expected differences between Chapter 7 firms and Chapter 11 firms are finer than the 
expected differences between bankrupt firms and viable firms, we hypothesize that this 
study will identify fewer explanatory variables with less discriminatory power than do 
traditional bankruptcy studies. In addition, we hypothesize that the predictive model will 
have less explanatory power (lower R-square) than traditional bankruptcy-prediction 
studies because of the similarity of Chapter 7 firms and Chapter 11 firms when compared 
with viable firms. The results of this research will help auditors, corporate management, 
corporate creditors and investors, and the FASB.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A plethora of research articles address bankruptcy prediction, starting with seminal works 
such as Beaver’s 1966 ratio analysis and Altman’s development of a Z-score in 1968. 
These previous works and the work conducted here are even more important in light of 
the FASB’s August 2014 accounting standards update (ASU) on going concern 
statements. This ASU requires corporate management to include in the financial 
statements (annual and interim) a statement about continuity-indicated concerns, 
beginning with reporting periods ending after December 15, 2016.  
Business managers and financial analysts have long used accounting information 
to make various decisions, including lending decisions. Practitioners used and recognized 
financial ratios as effective indicators of financial well-being decades before 
academicians systematically explored their usefulness. Articles about the value of 
financial data for failure prediction existed in the first half of the 20th century (e.g., 
Merwin 1942). More recently, however, Beaver and Altman wrote seminal research 
articles about using financial data for predictive purposes.  
In a 1966 study, Beaver examined the usefulness of ratios as predictors of 
corporate financial well-being. Beaver tested the usefulness of financial ratios with regard 
24  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences  Vol. 21 (2018) 
to a specific purpose: failure prediction. Beaver defined failure as the inability to make 
scheduled debt payments. He adopted three criteria for selecting ratios: popularity, ratio 
performance in previous studies, and ratios defined by cash flow. Popular ratios were 
those commonly found in the practical literature. Because corporate management knew 
that these ratios are common ones on which to judge corporate performance, Beaver 
expected corporations to “window dress” these ratios, which would result in the reduced 
utility of popular ratios. Beaver’s list of possible explanatory ratios numbered 30. He 
grouped these ratios into six “common element” categories and compared common 
element ratios by their ability to predict failure or non-failure. Beaver used the ratio in 
each category that predicted with the least error to represent the group. Beaver’s model 
included six ratios: cash flow to total debt, net income to total assets, debt to assets, 
working capital to total assets, current ratio, and quick assets less current liabilities 
(1966:78). He predicted that all the ratios would be greater for non-failed firms than for 
failed firms, with the exception of debt to assets, which should be greater for failed firms.  
Beaver used a univariate, dichotomous classification to test the predictive abilities 
of the six ratios. He arrayed the ratios in ascending order and selected a cutoff point that 
optimally classified the failed and non-failed firms. Stated another way, he selected a 
value for the ratio that best divided the firms into failed and non-failed groups. The 
optimal cutoff point minimized the misclassifications. Beaver calculated this optimal 
cutoff point for each of the six ratios; he did this 30 times: for each of the six ratios in 
each of the five years.  
Overall, Beaver’s ratios were quite predictive of failure. Cash flow to total debt 
was most accurate at 87 percent one year before failure. This declined to 78 percent five 
years before failure. Beaver noted that this level of accuracy is still much better than 
random prediction (50 percent). The order of accuracy (descending) of other factors was 
return on assets, debt to assets, working capital to total assets, and current ratio. Beaver 
tested for but did not find any conclusive evidence that either industry or asset size had 
any significant predictive ability. 
Altman developed his Z-score in 1968 as a bankruptcy-prediction model. 
Although researchers before Altman examined bankruptcy and provided evidence of 
financial predictability of bankruptcy, Altman’s work is often cited as the seminal work 
using statistical methods to evaluate and predict bankruptcy. Numerous researchers have 
since refined his model and developed specialized bankruptcy-prediction models. Altman 
examined 66 bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms using a multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA) method. Whereas Beaver examined the predictive ability of the ratios one at a 
time, MDA provided Altman the opportunity to examine the predictive power of the 
ratios in unison.  
Altman’s sample included 33 failed and 33 non-failed firms. The bankrupt firms 
filed for bankruptcy between January 1946 and December 1965. Non-failed firms were 
those still in existence in 1966. Altman’s group of non-failed firms “consisted of a paired 
sample of manufacturing firms chosen on a stratified random basis. The firms are 
stratified by industry and by size, with the asset size range restricted to between $1–$25 
million” (Altman 1968:594). 
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Altman’s variable selection began with an exposition of the 22 ratios reported to 
be significant in previous studies and several that Altman cited as possibly useful in his 
study. He grouped these ratios into five commonly used categories of “liquidity, 
profitability, leverage, solvency, and activity” (1968: 594). Altman’s final selection of 
five variables from among the 22 resulted from a four-step process: (1) determination of 
the contributions made by each variable independently, (2) examination of 
intercorrelations, (3) consideration of accuracy of various combinations of variables, and 
(4) “judgment of the analyst.” Altman performed many computer runs using different
linear combinations of ratio profiles (combinations of ratios) and found that earnings
before interest and taxes/total assets, market value equity/book value of total debt, and
sales/total assets were most significant.
Altman used three methods to test the results of his analysis. First, he used an F-
test. The model should divide the total sample into two groups—failed and successful 
firms—maximizing the distance between the means of the two groups and minimizing 
the variance of observations within each group. The F-test is a measure of how well the 
resulting model achieves this objective. Altman’s F-score was significant at the .01 level. 
In a second test of the model, Altman calculated the misclassifications of sample 
individual observations from data one year before failure. He multiplied individual data from 
sample firms by model coefficients to produce a Z-score. (The Z-score measures 
standardized deviation from the mean.) Altman classified the firms by comparing each firm’s 
Z-score with a benchmark Z-score. The accuracy in this test was quite high at 95 percent.  
Altman further analyzed predictive ability three to five years prior to failure. His 
results indicated that predictive accuracy falls considerably after the second year before 
failure. In fact, predictive accuracy dropped to 48 percent, 29 percent, and 36 percent for 
the third, fourth, and fifth years before failure, respectively. 
Ohlson (1980) used the logit model to analyze factors related to business failure: 
size and measures of financial structure, performance, and current liquidity. Ohlson 
matched failed and non-failed firms of similar size and industry, although uncertain what 
advantage matching provides. In fact, Ohlson found it more useful to use these factors as 
input variables rather than as selection variables. Ohlson collected data from industrial 
firms’ balance sheets, income statements, funds statements, and accountants’ reports for 
the three years before the firms’ failures. His listing of failed firms began with the Wall 
Street Journal Index. Size, debt to assets, return on assets, cash from operations/total debt, 
a dichotomous variable representing net loss (0/1), and a dichotomous variable 
representing negative solvency (0/1) were significant predictors of failure. The current 
study uses all these variables as input factors. 
Zavgren (1985) cited seven categories theoretically related to firm failure or non-
failure: return on investment, capital turnover, inventory turnover, financial leverage, 
receivables turnover, short-term liquidity, and cash position. Zavgren found that each of 
the variables tested showed some degree of significance in explaining failure, although 
cash position and short-term liquidity were most significant in the short term. Return on 
investment was the least significant of the explanatory variables.  
Zmijewski (1984) identified two methodological problems with failure-prediction 
studies. These are the data-collection problems of choice-based sample biases and sample 
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selection biases. Choice-based sample biases result when researchers select observations 
based on the dependent variable. Many researchers do this when one form of the 
dependent variable (i.e., failure) seldom occurs in the population sampled. Researchers 
use sample data sets with 50 percent failures and 50 percent successes even when failures 
in the population are less than 2 percent of observations. The study reported here includes 
all Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms in the time period studied for which data were 
available. Deleting observations with missing data may cause sample selection bias, if 
missing data is correlated with the dependent variable. Zmijewski’s results “do not 
indicate significant changes in overall classification and prediction rates, nor do they 
indicate different qualitative results (statistical inferences) for the financial distress model 
tested” (Zmijewski 1984:63). Neither of the issues that Zmijewski addressed are problems 
for the logistic regression method used in this study.  
In their 1999 study, Barney, Graves, and Johnson examined the predictive ability 
of 14 ratios on the ability of borrowers to make scheduled debt payments. The factors for 
the prediction model included twelve financial factors and two dichotomous variables 
representing previous debt trouble. The researchers examined ratios in the categories of 
liquidity (e.g., current ratio), solvency (e.g., asset turnover), profitability (e.g., return on 
assets), repayment capacity (e.g., cash debt coverage), and financial efficiency (e.g., asset 
turnover). The researchers found that nine ratios were correlated (p < .10) with making 
scheduled debt payments and that six of those nine ratios were highly correlated (p < .01) 
with making scheduled debt payments.  
Researchers have addressed the importance of differentiating Type I and Type II 
errors. Type I error, as applied to bankruptcy studies, is the error of predicting bankruptcy 
for a successful firm. Type II error, generally considered the more costly of the two, is 
the error of identifying as successful a firm that subsequently files for bankruptcy. 
Because this study does not include a study of successful firms, only bankrupt firms, 
Type I error would be the prediction that a Chapter 11 firm files for Chapter 7. Type II 
error would be the error of predicting that a Chapter 7 firm filed for Chapter 11. Although 
this study does not address Type I and Type II errors, it is interesting to note that such 
errors still apply. 
We anticipate that, when compared with traditional bankruptcy studies comparing 
bankrupt and viable firms, this study will identify fewer discriminatory factors of less 
significance in weaker predictive models. Still, identifying significant Chapter 7 versus 
Chapter 11 discriminatory factors will contribute to the relevant literature. 
GOING CONCERN 
U.S. (and international) auditing standards require auditors to provide a going concern 
qualification with the audit report if auditors have doubts about a corporation’s ability to 
continue functioning in its current form for the coming year. In other words, if the 
auditors expect the corporation to go out of business (Chapter 7) or undergo restructuring 
through bankruptcy proceedings (Chapter 11), the auditors should render a going concern 
opinion in their audit letter. The time frame for the auditors’ going concern decision is 
one year from the date of the financial statement. 
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Prior to the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley Act, auditors—theoretically, at least—
were more reluctant to issue going concern opinions. Issuance of such opinions could 
cost an auditor not only the auditing business of a particular client but also the much 
more lucrative consulting business. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act theoretically reduced (but 
did not eliminate) the conflict inherent in the auditor’s decision. According to section 201 
of the act, auditors may not also engage in certain other work (notably some forms of 
consulting) with their publicly traded audit clients.  
METHODOLOGY 
This study examined two sets of corporations: those that filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
and those that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy as reported by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The data were analyzed using correlation analysis, t-test of means, 
OLS, and logistic regression.  
Variables 
This study uses the variables identified conceptually by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), which were used in previous bankruptcy-prediction studies 
and are publicly available. According to the PCAOB, the auditors, when examining a 
client for possible bankruptcy, should consider “recurring operating losses, working 
capital deficiencies, negative cash flows from operating activities, [and] adverse key 
financial ratios” (PCAOB 1989). While the PCAOB statement on appropriate factors to 
consider is more recent than the works cited in the literature review, those seminal works 
are still relevant today and provide the foundation for variable selection in current 
bankruptcy studies. As expected, the PCAOB recommendations emulate factor selection 
from those previous studies. Table 1 lists the factors used in this study. 
It is anticipated that Chapter 11 firms will be in stronger financial positions than 
will Chapter 7 firms, albeit in weaker financial positions than will be viable firms; 
therefore, it is anticipated that all input factors except going concern and debt to assets 
will be higher on average for Chapter 11 firms than for Chapter 7 firms.  
Data 
The SEC lists financial (and other) data for all publicly traded companies. New Generation 
Research provides selected financial data for companies filing for bankruptcy. Data fields for 
the New Generation Research data list whether corporations filed for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, as well as dates of filing. SEC filings (Forms 10-K and 10-Q) include all the 
financial data and auditors’ letters needed for this study. The data collected for each 
corporation were from the last financial statements submitted to the SEC on form 10-K 
immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing date, but not more than two years prior to the 
bankruptcy filing date. The data set includes all publicly traded companies filing for 
bankruptcy from January 1, 2009, to February 1, 2013. Of the original 500 publicly traded 
firms filing for bankruptcy during this period, 75 did not provide a 10-K to the SEC for the 
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two years prior to their bankruptcy filing dates. This study includes the remaining 425 firms, 
which consist of 75 U.S. firms that filed for Chapter 7 bakruptcy and 350 that filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Following are a few idiosyncratic financial facts about these 
companies from the final 10-K before the bankruptcy filings. 
Largest sales Lyondell Chemical Chemical $22,674,000,000 
Greatest Loss Nortel Networks Telephone $5,799,000,000 
Greatest Profit Idearc Advertising $183,000,000 
Most Assets CIT Group Finance $80,448,900,000 
Most Debt CIT Group Finance $72,279,800,000 
Greatest Retained Earnings Eastman Kodak Photographic $4,071,000,000 
Greatest Retained Deficit Nortel Networks Telephone $42,362,000,000 
Table 1. Factors Included in This Study 
Liquidity 
 CR current ratio = current assets / current liabilities 
CCDC 
current cash debt coverage = cash from operations / current 
liabilities 
Activity 
 ARTO accounts receivable turnover = net sales / average trade receivables 
INTTO inventory turnover = cost of goods sold / average inventory 
ATO 
 
asset turnover = net sales / average total assets 
Profitability 
 PM profit margin = net income / sales 
ROA return on assets = net income / total assets 
CFOA cash flows on assets = cash from operations / total assets 
Coverage 
 DA debt to assets = total debt / total assets 
CDC 
 
cash debt coverage = cash from operations / total debt 
Financial History 
 PP past performance = retained earnings / total assets 
RE01 retained earnings / deficit (0 = deficit, 1 = no deficit) 
PNI01 
 
previous year income (0 = NOL, 1 = NI) 
Other Factors 
 Total Assets at year end, stated in hundreds of millions of dollars 
GCAR 
 
auditor report (0 = unqualified, 1 = going concern) 
Dependent Variable Bankruptcy (0 = Chapter 7, 1 = Chapter 11) 
Note: NI=net income; NOL=net operating loss. 
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Of the 425 firms, 252 received going concern statements from auditors, although 
the period examined was a two-year window and auditors are required to consider only a 
one-year window.  
Table 2 provides summary averages of all ratios. Not all ratios (e.g., inventory 
turnover) are applicable to all firms and were therefore not used in the calculation. 
Table 2. Summary of Data Characteristics 
Factor N Mean Median 
CR 418 2.02 0.68 
CCDC 420 0.21 –0.06
ARTO 337 22.97 8.71
INTTO 193 23.63 6.24
ATO 393 0.91 0.66
PM 395 –12.23 –0.34
ROA 423 –6.23 –0.22
CFOA 423 –1.67 –0.22
DA 423 2.63 0.96
CDC 425 –0.17 –0.02
PP 423 –138.10 –0.78
RE01 425 15% of firms had positive retained earnings 
PNI01 425 24% of firms had a prior year net income instead of loss 
Total Assets 425 16.62 (in hundreds of $millions) 
GCAR 425 59% of firms received going concern statements 
Bankruptcy 425 83% filed Chapter 11; 17% filed Chapter 7 
Financial ratios for firms undergoing financial stress can be quite different from 
ratios for viable firms. Financial stress may significantly affect the current ratio, for 
example. Of 418 observations, only 155 firms had current ratios above 1. Fifty-six (56) 
firms had current ratios less than 0.1. Of 420 observations, 245 firms reported negative 
current cash debt coverage, due to negative cash from operations. Similarly, 246 of 423 
observations for cash flow on assets were negative. Most of these observations (200) 
were between 0 and –1. Accounts receivable turnover varied dramatically. Firms with 
minimal sales and accounts receivable balances had account receivable turnover near 0; 
one hundred ninety-two (192) firms had accounts receivable turnover less than 1. Firms 
nearing bankruptcy or contemplating bankruptcy may let inventory levels approach zero, 
even if they are retailers, resulting in large inventory turnover ratios. One-third of the 193 
observations for inventory turnover were ratios in excess of 10.  
30  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences  Vol. 21 (2018) 
Asset turnover ratio may be a strong indicator of financial distress. Asset turnover 
and profit margin were missing 30 observations because 30 firms had no sales. With the 
firms having no sales for the last 10-K before filing bankruptcy, one might expect that 
most or all of these firms would file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Actually, however, only 
12 of these 30 firms (40 percent) filed Chapter 7. The other 18 (60 percent) firms without 
sales filed for Chapter 11, in anticipation of continuing operations. Of the 393 
observations for asset turnover, 144 exceeded 1, and 50 exceeded 2.  
The highest return on assets was 2.67. Four firms had return on assets greater than 
1, and only 40 firms had a positive return on assets. Financially distressed firms do not 
make efficient use their assets. Too much debt gets firms into trouble, from which they 
cannot recover. Of 423 observations for debt to assets, 244 had debt-to-asset ratios less 
than 1, but 75 of these had debt-to-asset ratios between .9 and 1.0. Having a respectable 
debt-to-asset ratio did not guarantee that a firm would avoid bankruptcy. Seventy-nine 
(79) bankrupt firms had debt-to-asset ratios of less than .4 in the last 10-K filed before 
filing for bankruptcy. These firms often had at least two consecutive loss years.
A retained deficit was common among the firms. Of 423 observations, 358 had 
retained deficits. Of 395 reporting firms, 40 (10 percent) had positive net income in the 
last 10-K before filing bankruptcy. This compares with 24 percent filing positive net 
income the previous year. Apparently, some firms that had the potential to continue 
without bankruptcy were pushed over the edge by one (or more) bad years. 
Data Analysis and Results 
To test our hypotheses, we have used several quantitative methods. 
t-Test. The Pearson two-tailed correlation shows the level of correlation between 
the two examined variables, the direction of the correlation, and the significance of the 
relationship. The t-test, with assumed unequal variances, examines for significance the 
differences in means for each variable between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. 
Results, displayed in Table 3, indicate that Chapter 11 firms look stronger than 
the Chapter 7 firms, and means are in the anticipated direction. Both sets of firms, 
especially the Chapter 11 firms, have respectable current ratio averages. While the 
current cash debt coverage ratio is negative for Chapter 7 firms, this ratio is positive for 
Chapter 11 firms, with a significant difference. Both sets of firms have very large 
accounts-receivable and inventory-turnover ratios immediately prior to filing for 
bankruptcy. The financial statements show that firms tend to have low levels of inventory 
and accounts receivable compared with what might be expected in their industries. Asset 
turnover varied significantly between the two sets of firms, and for neither set did this 
ratio average breach 1. Profit margin averaged negative for both sets of firms and did not 
differ significantly between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms.  
Return on assets and cash flows on assets were, on average, negative for both 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. Debt to assets was at distressing levels for both 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. With debt-to-asset ratios of 3.21 and 2.51 for Chapter 
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7 and Chapter 11 firms, respectively, it is not surprising that these firms are applying 
for bankruptcy.  
Cash debt coverage varied significantly between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms 
but averaged negative for both. Financial history of the firm (in the form of past 
performance, retained-earnings dichotomous variable, or previous-year income) did not 
vary significantly between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. Assets were significantly 
larger for Chapter 11 firms than for Chapter 7 firms. This may be due to Chapter 11 firms 
being larger initially than Chapter 7 firms or, as was seen in numerous cases, due to 
Chapter 7 firms selling off assets in efforts to save the businesses. Chapter 7 firms were 
significantly more likely to receive going concern statements from auditors than were 
Chapter 11 firms, with 76 percent of Chapter 7 firms receiving going concern statements 
and 56 percent of Chapter 11 firms receiving going concern statements. 
Table 3. t-test Results for Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 Bankruptcies 
Factor Chapter 7 
Mean 
Chapter 11 
Mean 
t-value
CR 1.21 2.20 –.92 
CCDC –1.34 .53 –1.68+
ARTO 33.47 21.51 .50 
INTTO 27.60 23.24 .23 
ATO .69 .96 –1.73+
PM –25.97 –9.74 –1.66
ROA –28.57 –1.47 –1.00
CFOA –7.46 –.56 –1.03
DA 3.21 2.51 1.00
CDC –.68 –.06 –1.83+
PP –751.31 –9.91 –1.01
RE01 .14 .16 –.43
PNI01 .219 .25 –.57
Assets 6.14 18.83 –2.94**
GCAR .76 .56 3.49** 
**p < .01 +p < .10
Although none of the correlations (Table 4) were greater than .2, this was 
expected, as it is difficult to discriminate between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 
bankruptcies. Still, the results are impressive because they show that although difficult, it 
is possible to identify some distinctions between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
filings using financial data.  
All significant correlations were in the anticipated direction. Of the significant 
correlations, asset turnover is the least correlated (.094) with type of bankruptcy, but the 
correlation is significant (p < .10). As asset turnover increases,so does the likelihood that 
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a firm will file for Chapter 11 versus Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Likewise, return on assets 
and cash flow on assets positively correlated (p < .05) with bankruptcy type. Like asset 
turnover, a better return on assets or cash flow on assets indicates greater likelihood that a 
firm will plan to continue operations after bankruptcy proceedings.  
Debt to assets is negatively correlated with bankruptcy type, as expected. As the 
debt-to-asset ratio increases, a firm becomes more likely to select Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
and cease operations.  
Past performance of the firm is a significant (p < .05) correlate of the type of 
bankruptcy filing, but the correlation is perhaps not as strong as anticipated. Current 
performance, in contrast, did not provide a significant relationship. Going concern 
explanation by the external auditors was the most significant (p < .01) predictor of 
bankruptcy filing and provided the most explanatory power. The negative correlation 
indicates that a firm filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy is more likely to receive a going 
concern explanation in its auditor letter. This is rational, as firms filing Chapter 7 a priori 
would have worse ratios and would therefore garner more auditor attention. 
Table 4. Correlations of Factors Used 
Factor Correlation with Bankruptcy Type 
CR .02 
CCDC .04 
ARTO –.06 
INTTO –.01 
ATO .10+ 
PM .08 
ROA .11* 
CFOA .11* 
DA –.11* 
CDC .05 
PP .11* 
RE01 .02 
PNI01 .03 
Assets .08 
GCAR –.15** 
+p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Ordinary Least Square Regression. We used the OLS model (Aldrich and Nelson 
1984:10) to predict the factors affecting Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. The 
objective of the OLS model is to select coefficients (bk) to minimize the sum of the 
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squared differences between the observed outcomes and the predicted outcomes. The 
OLS model is 
Yi = ΣbkXik + ui 
where bk is a vector of unknown coefficients, X is the observed independent variable, and 
u is the error term. In this context (Yi is either 0 or 1), the model is a “linear probability
model.” The observed outcomes are either 0 or 1: Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Because the methodology does not place bounds on the predicted outcomes, the resulting
OLS model may yield probabilities greater than 1 or less than 0. The logit model, which
we will discuss next, theoretically improves on OLS by restricting the predicted
probabilities from 0 to 1.
We ran two different OLS models (Table 5). First, using all the input variables 
above, we identified two variables as significant components in the model: asset turnover 
and going concern. Model 1 provided an adjusted R-square of .037 (p < .10). Although 
the model was significant at predicting bankruptcy type, the overall model did not have 
much explanatory power. This result is consistent throughout the statistical methods used 
above and was anticipated. 
Table 5. OLS Results 
Dependent Variable: 
Bankruptcy Type 
Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Variables B t B t 
CR –.08 –1.08 –.05 –.69 
CCDC .03 .34 .08 1.01 
ARTO –.10 –1.48 –.09 –1.38
INTTO –.01 –.19 –.02 –.29 
ATO –.13 –1.88+ –.13 –1.89+
PM .07 .93 .05 .68 
ROA –.05 –.32 –.06 –.15 
CFOA –.04 –.33 –.004 –.04 
DA –.04 –.28 .19 .48 
CDC .11 1.27 .10 1.19 
PP .18 1.61 .31 1.94+ 
RE .07 .98 .10 1.40 
PNI –.01 –.08 .01 .08 
Assets .05 .77 .05 .80 
GC –.13 –1.66+
+p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
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Because the auditors develop the going concern audit report after examining the 
other financial factors, it is useful to examine the significance of other factors without 
going concern audit report as an input factor; we therefore ran a second OLS model 
without going concern (Model 2). The removal of the going concern audit report resulted 
in the significance of past performance as an input factor. The overall fit of the model, 
however, dropped to an adjusted R-square of .035 (with a significance of .293), which 
means the model has no explanatory power without going concern audit report. 
Logistic Regression. Researchers cite the advantages of logistic regression models 
in studies with dichotomous dependent variables because logistics regression does not 
assume linearity between the dependent and independent variables (Stone and Rasp 
1997). Accounting researcher studies show that OLS can perform as well as logistic 
regression (Gessner et al. 1988). OLS assumes that the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables is linear. OLS also identifies the regression line 
fitting the data as the line that minimizes the sum of the squares of the errors of the 
predictions from the observations.  
On the other hand, researchers use logit in many dichotomous output models, 
including failure-prediction models. Stone and Rasp (1997) noted a preference for logit 
over OLS in accounting-choice studies, even in studies using small sample sizes. Articles 
in the accounting research literature provide results of comparisons of OLS and logistic 
regression (logit and probit).  
Noreen (1988) compared probit and OLS using samples of 50 and 100 
observations—sizes he describes as average for accounting classification studies—with 
several ratios and at least one dummy variable as independent variables. Stone and Rasp 
identified and researched the tradeoffs between OLS and logit, stating that researchers 
can expect logit “to be more powerful whenever the relationship being modeled is 
nonlinear” (1997:184). 
The logit model assumes a logistic relationship between the inputs and output. 
This model is 
P(Y = 1│X) = exp(ΣbkXk) / [1 + exp(ΣbkXk)]
where b represents the coefficient estimates of the model and X represents the observed 
values (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). 
The objective of logistic regression is to select coefficients (bk) that maximize the 
likelihood of predicting the observed outcome (0/1). Maximum likelihood estimation 
seeks to maximize the logit likelihood function (Aldrich and Nelson 1984): 
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The logit model provides probabilities of success or failure but, unlike the OLS model, 
limits the output from 0 to 1. 
We ran stepwise logistic regression using input variables in a forward integration 
logit model with .09/.10 probabilities and 411 observations. The results of the analysis, 
shown in Table 6, indicate that the model had a Cox and Snell R-square of .057. 
Table 6. Results of Logistic Regression 
B SE (B) Wald Sig. OR 
Step 1 GC –1.39 .57 5.84 < .05 .25 
Constant 3.18 .51 38.78 < .001 24.00 
Step 2 ATO –0.36 .19 3.67 < .10 .70 
GC –1.55 .59 6.92 < .01 .22 
Constant 3.77 .63 35.83 < .001 43.42 
Step 3 ATO –0.38 .19 4.15 < .05 68 
PP 0.02 .01 2.61 .11 1.02 
GC –1.37 .61 5.08 < .05 .25 
Constant 3.83 .64 36.16 < .001 46.26 
The above models show that going concern audit report is the strongest 
determinant of bankruptcy type. This is logical, given that the auditors will incorporate 
the other factor information (e.g., debt to assets, return on assets, past performance) in 
their going concern audit report decisions. Because the auditors develop the going 
concern audit report after examining the other financial factors, it is useful to examine the 
significance of other factors without going concern audit report as an input factor.  
Table 7. Logit Stepwise Regression without GCAR 
Variable Model Log Likelihood 
Change in –2 
Log Likelihood 
Step 1 CCDC –71.95 4.04* 
Step 2 CCDC –71.02 5.60* 
ATO –69.97 3.51+ 
Step 3 CCDC –67.84 4.59* 
ATO –67.45 3.81+ 
RE –68.44 5.78* 
+p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
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Without going concern audit report, logit included three factors in the model: 
current cash debt coverage, asset turnover, and retained earnings (dichotomous variable). 
The model without going concern audit report had a Cox and Snell R-square of .055. As 
the results shows (Table 7), results were slightly different once we removed going 
concern from our model.  
Table 8 outlines the factors determined with each method to have a significant 
relationship with bankruptcy type. 
Table 8. Summary of Findings 
Factor t-test Correlation 
OLS 
with 
GCAR 
OLS 
without 
GCAR 
Logit 
with 
GCAR 
Logit 
without 
GCAR 
CR 
CCDC X X 
ARTO 
INTTO 
ATO X X X X X X 
PM 
ROA X 
CFOA X 
DA X 
CDC X 
PP X X X 
RE01 X 
PNI01 
Assets X 
GCAR X X X X 
Asset turnover was a significant factor in every statistical method differentiating 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. Apparently, efficiency of operations focusing on use of 
assets is a strong determining factor in planned corporate continuity. The going concern 
audit report was also a significant determining factor in all statistical methods in which it 
was available. This is not surprising, as the auditors have access to all the data analyzed 
here, and more.  
Past performance in the form of retained earnings over assets was identified three 
times as significant. The three factors directly involving current assets—current ratio, 
accounts receivable turnover, and inventory turnover—did not differ between Chapter 7 
and Chapter 11 firms and were not significant determining factors in any statistical 
Barney and Kara  Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Factors  37 
method. Firms nearing a bankruptcy decision see dramatic changes to their current-asset 
and current-liability positions. This may well cloud the picture for these firms.  
Profit margin in the current year and whether the firm was profitable the prior 
year did not differ significantly between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms, nor were these 
two factors identified in any statistical model as significant input factors. It is possible 
that the question of whether to file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 hinges more on the 
longer-term perspective than recent operations of results, based on the lack of 
significance of the ratios using current assets and current liabilities and the ratios of 
current and past-year profit performance. 
CONCLUSION 
Previous research has identified key factors separating bankrupt corporations from viable 
corporations, but this work has taken the previous research one step further, by 
differentiating between corporate bankruptcy types and examining factors explanatory of 
bankruptcy type (Chapter 7 or Chapter 11). Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
filings are indicators that firms have serious financial trouble. Although, based on prior 
studies, there is a distinct financial contrast between viable firms and firms filing for 
bankruptcy, the financial contrast between firms filing for Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 
bankruptcy is not as distinct. Still, there are significant financial differences between 
firms filing for the two types of bankruptcy. This study identified and discussed some of 
those financial differences, and the results of this research will help auditors, corporate 
management, corporate creditors and investors, and the FASB.  
Corporate management and public auditors must make going-concern decisions 
about corporations’ abilities to remain in business for the coming year. A model 
differentiating Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and viable firms can help corporate management 
make a decision or can help reinforce a decision already made. The model can also serve 
as an additional warning of impending bankruptcy. Such a warning can provide an 
impetus for management to make needed changes in time to save the corporation. 
The FASB may well be the greatest beneficiary of this research. The FASB has 
issued an ASU requiring corporate management to render going concern letters. Such 
required letters could have more than one form of wording; they could include phrasing 
to indicate that the corporation plans to liquidate (Chapter 7) versus undertake financial 
restructuring (Chapter 11). Corporate management would therefore decide whether to 
issue a going concern letter, and, if so, whether that letter incorporates Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 11 wording. 
Corporate creditors will also benefit from this research. Previous research has 
examined bankrupt corporations versus viable corporations. Chapter 11 financial 
reorganization changes the dynamics of creditor positions in the corporation yet may 
allow creditors to maintain a financial position, as opposed to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  
There is a similar benefit for investors. Chapter 7 bankruptcy means the cessation 
of business and often means that investors receive little, if any, remuneration. Chapter 11 
bankruptcy may provide the opportunity for investors to maintain some financial position 
in the corporation, depending on the terms of reorganization.  
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